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ABSTRACT 
Over time, states form relationships.  These relationships, mosaics of past interactions, provide 
political leaders with information about how states are likely to behave in the future.  Although intuitive, 
this claim holds important implications for the manner in which we construct and evaluate empirically 
our expectations about interstate behavior.  Empirical analyses of interstate relations implicitly assume 
that the units of analysis are independent.  Theories of interstate interaction are often cast in the absence 
of historical context.  In the following article we construct a dynamic model of interstate interaction that 
we believe will assist scholars in empirical and theoretical studies by incorporating a substantively 
interpretable historical component into their models of interstate relations.  Our conceptual model 
includes both conflictual and cooperative components, and exhibits the basic properties of growth and 
decay that characterize dyadic relationships.  In an empirical exposition, we derive a continuous measure 
of interstate conflict from the conflictual component of the model.  We rely on Oneal and Russett’s 
(1997) analysis of dyadic conflict for the period 1950-85 as a benchmark, and examine whether the 
inclusion of our measure of interstate conflict significantly improves our ability to predict militarized 
conflict.  We find empirical support for this hypothesis, indicating that our continuous measure of 
interstate conflict significantly augments a well-known statistical model of dyadic militarized conflict.  
Our findings reinforce the assertion that historical processes in interstate relationships represent 
substantively important elements in models of interstate behavior rather than econometric nuisances.  
INTRODUCTION 
When Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa traveled to 
Shepherdstown, West Virginia in December 1999 to restart the negotiations over the Golan Heights, the 
engagement between the two government representatives was the latest in a lengthy series of interactions 
between Israel and Syria.  Even prior to the declaration by Israel of its statehood in 1948, Syria and its 
Arab League allies sought the destruction of the Jewish enclave and the unification of Palestine.  During 
the Cold War, this pitched antagonism between Israel and its Arab neighbors generated nearly 100 
militarized disputes, of which four qualified as interstate wars (Jones, Bremer, Singer, 1996; Singer and 
Small, 1994).
1  Thus, the interactions between the Israeli negotiators and their Syrian counterparts in 
Shepherdstown—a rare attempt at cooperation between the two countries—took place against a backdrop 
of protracted hatred and conflict.  
Although the meeting in Shepherdstown might have demonstrated a willingness on the part of 
Israel and Syria to resolve their differences concerning the Golan peacefully, their bargaining did not 
occur in an historical vacuum.  Rather, the strategies that the respective representatives of each state 
sought to pursue were, in part, a function of their history.  The choices of the Israeli and Syrian delegates 
at the bargaining table and the likelihood of various outcomes were conditioned to some extent by the 
prior relationship between the two countries, a relationship that was nearly entirely characterized by 
conflict.  Certainly, the claim that history is relevant to future interstate relations is perhaps obvious to 
the point of triviality.  However, understanding how history influences present and future political 
interaction, as well as the degree to which this relationship obtains, remains a challenge for scholars 
interested in studying interstate relations.  
The goal of this article is to develop the theoretical tools necessary to estimate historical 
relationships in world politics, as well as to emphasize the importance of modeling these effects  
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explicitly in empirical estimations of these relationships.  In building this model, we are guided by three 
objectives.  First, we wish to develop a model of interstate interaction that captures historical dynamic 
processes.  Second, the model we construct should be flexible enough to adapt to different historical 
processes, ranging from extreme animosity to extreme affinity.  Finally, our model should accommodate 
linkages to the specification of statistical models without losing our ability to interpret the role of history 
in political behavior.  We seek to understand how history provides a context within which states interact, 
and the capacity to separate this context from others (e.g., major power status, economic growth, dyadic 
democracy, or contiguity) lies in our ability to go beyond the generic assertion that history matters to 
specify historical relationships in order to assess their effect on interstate relationships.  
PERSPECTIVES ABOUT THE DYNAMICS OF HISTORY IN WORLD POLITICS 
The idea that interstate behavior is a process rather than a discrete series of events emerges from a 
long line of models of interstate reciprocity.  In a research agenda initially established by Richardson 
(1960), a group of scholars employed a “stimulus-response” approach to investigate the link between 
leader perceptions and actions in the crises preceding the First World War (North, Brody, Holsti, 1964; 
Zinnes, 1968, 1976).  Later, other scholars pursued similar strategies in modeling arms races more 
generally (Wallace, 1979; Diehl, 1985).  Work in this area has continued in game theory (e.g., Axelrod, 
1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1986), time-series analyses of the superpower relationship (Ward, 1981, 
1982; McGinnis and Williams, 1989), and Dixon’s (1983) dynamic formulation of interstate affect.  
These initial analyses of reciprocity were later joined by a second wave of research addressing the 
dynamics of interstate cooperation and conflict (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990; Rajmaira and Ward, 
1990; Goldstein, 1991, 1995; Kinsella, 1994, 1995; Oren 1994; Moore, 1995; Goldstein and Pevehouse, 
1997; Rajmaira, 1997, 1999). 
In a parallel body of work, scholars sought to explain patterns of “recurrent” conflict between 
states.  This literature investigated the way in which outstanding issues between states conditioned the  
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likelihood of subsequent militarized conflict (Diehl, 1992; Hensel, 1994), the link between strategic 
reputation and the behavior of states in subsequent crises (Leng and Wheeler, 1979; Leng and Walker, 
1982; Leng, 1983, 1993), prior success in crisis bargaining as a predictor of subsequent bargaining 
strategy (Gelpi, 1997), and the impact of prior militarized conflict on the subsequent likelihood of 
dispute escalation (Maoz, 1984; Partell, 1997).  Finally, the importance of militarized competitions as 
predictors of future interstate conflict is the centerpiece of a burgeoning literature on interstate rivalries, 
particularly those rivalries that are characterized as “enduring” (McGinnis, 1990; Goertz and Diehl, 
1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2000; Huth and Russett, 1993; Lieberman, 1995; Thompson, 1995, 1998; 
Bennett, 1996, 1997a-b, 1998; Hensel, 1996; Diehl, 1998; Diehl and Goertz, 2000). 
The findings in this broad body of work on interstate interaction reinforce our intuitive sense that 
conflict and cooperation occurring between pairs of states is a time-dependent process.  That is, the 
occurrence of cooperation between two states at time t, for example, conditions the likelihood that 
cooperation will occur between these two states at time t+n.  This claim that dyadic interstate interaction 
is temporally dependent has important implications for the way in which we theorize and formulate our 
hypotheses, as well as the way in which we specify our statistical models.   
However, several characteristics of the current literature handicap our ability to study the dynamic 
qualities of interstate interaction.  First, while the aforementioned literatures present the researcher with 
the advantage of modeling interstate behavior in a more dynamic fashion, this body of work has been 
spatially biased.  The principal focus has been on the relations between subsets of states that are selected, 
a priori, for their specific characteristics, particularly the presence of conflictual relations.   
Second, analyses reported in the rivalry literature primarily consider rivalry to be a discrete quality 
occurring between states.  We argue, however, that rivalries are dynamic, and therefore continuous 
processes.  Interstate rivalry does not turn on and off discretely; it evolves over time as a function of 
consistent behavior.  The intensity of the rivalry and the rate at which it exacerbates or ameliorates is a 
function of the severity and frequency of conflict and cooperation that shape the history of dyadic  
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behavior.  Thus, a pair of states may increase or decrease the degree of its rivalry across time, and we 
argue that it is critical to model this dynamism explicitly.  
Finally, in the past 10 years the “dyad-year” has become the dominant unit of analysis in large-N, 
quantitative analyses of interstate relations (e.g., see Bremer, 1992, 1993; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Oneal 
and Russett, 1997; Remmer, 1998).  While large-N studies offer the researcher benefits in terms of 
sample size, this mode of analysis again lends itself to an over-reliance on the conceptualization of 
interstate behavior as a series of discrete events or interactions between pairs of states.  Historical 
processes, once the centerpiece of several research agendas in world politics, are treated as temporal 
dependence to be accounted for statistically but not interpreted substantively.  We find this approach 
counterintuitive; a situation in which we are throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater.
2   
For example, Beck and Tucker (1996) and Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) address this issue of 
temporal dependence in statistical models with discrete dependent variables.  While the time-series 
literature contains a number of statistical corrections for temporal dependence, or autocorrelation,
3 Beck, 
et al., furnish an attractive remedy—the “logit spline” model—for accounting for temporal dependence in 
research designs involving the use of binary dependent variables in time-series–cross-sectional research 
designs.  The influence of the Beck, et al. approach on the current literature, particularly studies of 
militarized interstate conflict, is already marked (e.g., see Oneal and Russett, 1997, 1999; Clark and Hart, 
1998; Henderson, 1998). 
Although we support the importance of properly specifying econometric models that would 
otherwise violate the assumptions upon which these models are based, our concern with the recent 
emphasis on econometric corrections is that these techniques dispose of theoretically and substantively 
important information.  If the historical relationship is theoretically important, then the researcher needs 
to be able to interpret the role of this history empirically.  Rather than seeking to expunge these 
properties from the data matrix, scholars should consider them to be theoretically meaningful 
contributions to the general conclusion.  Therefore, the tools we develop below are not intended to  
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compete with the recent techniques intended to address issues of temporal dependence.  Rather, they are 
designed to offer scholars a theoretical alternative that enables them to evaluate the substantive 
importance of historical events. 
THE AGENDA 
Why is it important to shift the current treatment of history in the literature from econometric 
correction to a theoretically informed concept?  Three answers to this question serve to motivate this 
study.  First, the evolving historical relationships between states are complex processes that vary from 
dyad to dyad.  The aforementioned techniques do not sufficiently approximate these dynamic processes 
given our level of knowledge about these relationships.  As such, we remain convinced that scholars need 
not rely only on naïve methods, such as employing lagged values of the dependent variable or auto-
regressive error correction techniques, to incorporate historical context into their empirical and formal 
models.  Second, even if the econometric corrections continue to become more sophisticated, as 
exemplified by the Beck, Katz, and Tucker and the Rakenrud and Hegre (1997) approaches, the historical 
relationship between two states provides crucial information about the future interaction of those states.  
Third, dyadic histories are composed of considerably more information about state interactions than what 
can be found solely in prior information reflected in the dependent variable, and we can exploit this 
information to improve our ability to understand which elements of the past affect future interstate 
relations. 
This information is relevant for many of the theories of international conflict.  In the action-
reaction models introduced by Richardson (1960), for example, one state’s reaction to another’s military 
spending is determined in part by two parameters, threat and grievance.  These two parameters are often 
set as initial conditions by the researcher, or considered as variables in the analysis of the model.  The 
historical relationship between the two countries is a logical source of information for setting the initial 
conditions of such a model.  Other dimensions of the relationship may also be relevant, but the concepts  
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of threat and grievance are almost certainly influenced by the past.  Similarly, Zinnes and Muncaster 
(1984) provide a systemic model that emphasizes the dynamics of hostility and the occurrence of war.  
One of the "primitive variables" employed in their analysis is the notion of a hostility level.  The level of 
hostility in the system is defined by the "intensity of hostility that … nations 'feel' towards any other 
nation in the defined system at the time t, without regard to initiator or target" (1984:188).  In their study, 
Zinnes and Muncaster formulate the relationship between the dynamics of hostility, escalation, and war, 
but the hostility level variable plays a key role in many components of their model.   
More recently, strategic models have become central to the research agenda in world politics.  
Specifically, scholars are increasingly turning to a body of game-theoretic models of incomplete or 
imperfect information in order to understand strategic interactions between states.  These models are 
frequently structured such that an initial move made by the “state of nature” determines a key 
characteristic, or type (e.g., “dove” or “hawk”), for one or both states.  This determination of type is 
private information, and opponents know only the probability distribution from which nature draws its 
move.  Thus far, scholars have been reluctant to explore the underlying source(s) driving the distribution 
of player types from which nature selects.  Again, our intuition is that the historical relationship between 
the two states is a useful source of information for the initial parameters of a game-theoretic 
representation of interstate interactions.  For example, the historical relationship may inform the initial 
beliefs of the states (prior to any updating.)  Our argument here is not intended to detract from the 
structure and analysis of the strategic model.  We simply suggest that the initial conditions of any model 
have significant bearing on the conclusions that one draws from that model. 
It is important to note here that the modeling process we engage in below is slightly different from 
the two types of models discussed in the previous paragraph.  Our goal is to use some basic tools of 
dynamic modeling to develop a concept, and thus we do not provide a causal model of interstate conflict 
or cooperation.  Instead, we develop a model capturing the historical record of interstate relationships.   
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We assert that this model provides important contextual information for the study of world politics, with 
the understanding that this assertion must eventually be reconciled with the empirical record. 
How are we to achieve the goal of developing empirical measures of interstate behavior that are 
dynamic, generalizable, and may be used to inform other models or as explanatory variables in large-N, 
cross-national empirical analyses?  We must first make progress in identifying the causal mechanism(s) 
that translate individual events in an interstate relationship into an “interaction history.”  In other words, 
it is not enough to simply posit that patterns of recurrent conflict and cooperation are crucial to 
understanding and predicting interstate behavior.  We must also explicate the way in which interstate 
interaction is processed by states over time.   
Embracing a strategy of rigor at the conceptualization stage will pay dividends when translating 
the concept of an interaction history into this empirical form.  Using basic properties of growth and 
decay, we develop a model that integrates the complexity of aggregating events over time.  This approach 
allows us to generate a concept of interaction that is intuitive, continuous, and, perhaps most important, 
independent of any specific data source.   
To demonstrate the viability of this model as a foundation for deriving measures of interstate 
behavior that address the issues of dynamism, generalizability, and flexibility, in the final section of this 
article we use the data and logit model advanced by Oneal and Russett (1997) in their study of the causes 
of dyadic militarized interstate dispute involvement for the period 1950-1985.  In brief, we show that the 
variable we derive from our dynamic model, Conflict Interaction Level, has a significant effect on the 
subsequent presence of militarized interstate disputes.  This finding renders support for the hypothesis 
central to the reciprocity, recurrent conflict, and rivalry literatures.  Our empirical analysis also reveals 
that the variable Conflict Interaction Level ranks high on a hierarchy of variables linked to interstate 
conflict with respect to its effect on the probability of dispute involvement, thus significantly augmenting 
our ability to predict the occurrence of this interstate behavior in a multivariate analysis.    
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More broadly, we demonstrate the importance of dynamic modeling, and the empirical measures 
we derive from these types of exercises, for the quantitative study of world politics.  The development of 
these types of models furthers our ability to investigate interstate relations in world politics.  
Incorporating this knowledge into our econometric models enables us to study the substantive impact of 
the dyadic historical relationship along with the standard variables of interest without losing valuable 
information. Lastly, we show that incorporating dynamic measures of interstate behavior into the 
dominant approach to the study of quantitative interstate behavior—i.e., large-N, cross-national dyadic 
studies—is viable with, but not limited to, data that are currently available to the field. 
THE DIMENSIONS OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS 
The first step in building our model involves identifying the basic dimensions of interstate 
behavior.  Regardless of whether the researcher is concerned with reciprocity or interstate rivalry, for 
example, we can identify a general set of concepts that will serve as a foundation for our dynamic model 
of interstate interaction.  The reciprocity literature focuses on the longitudinal properties of cooperative 
and conflictual behavior.  The recurrent conflict literature suggests that issues that are outstanding 
between states, such as territorial claims, as well the relative importance of an issue, affect the likelihood 
of subsequent interactions between pairs of states.  In defining the subset of dyads that they label 
“enduring rivalries,” Goertz and Diehl (1993, 1995, 2000) rely on indicators of the frequency and 
temporal distribution of conflictual interactions between states; the more frequent the militarized 
interactions between pairs of states across a lengthier period of time, the greater the likelihood that an 
enduring rivalry is present.
4 
Despite their distinct theoretical and methodological traditions, these literatures rely on a common 
set of dimensions in order to characterize these interstate relationships.  Together, these dimensions 
reflect the fundamental characteristics of a portfolio of events occurring between two states over time.  
Specifically, interstate relationships can be characterized by four general dimensions that we draw, in  
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part, from Goertz and Diehl’s (1993:159-160) distillation of the “COW [Correlates of War] definition” of 
interstate rivalry:  
•  Accumulation.  For pairs of states with a history of frequent interaction, the interstate 
relationship should be well defined and further interaction should have a decreasing 
marginal effect.  Conversely, in a dyad with a history characterized by infrequent 
interaction, the relationship is weakly defined and further interaction should have an 
increasing marginal effect; 
•  Temporal Distance.  The temporal distance between these interactions affects the interstate 
relationship.  For example, the relationship between a pair of states that engages in two 
events separated by 20 years is different from that of a pair of states that engages in two 
events within a single year.  If two events are temporally proximate, the states involved are 
less likely to have focused their attention elsewhere after the first event when the second 
occurs.  In the case of two events separated by 20 years it is far more likely that these 
events will be treated as independent from one another by the states involved than they 
would be in the case in which both events transpire in the same year;  
•  Degree.  Interstate interaction is also a function of the extent, or degree, of the cooperative 
and conflictual interactions that occur between pairs of states.  Thus, interstate interactions 
characterized by the trading of verbal threats to restrict immigration are different in degree 
than states that engage one another in a militarized clash.  Similarly, interstate interactions 
characterized by the mutual lowering of tariffs on a specific commodity are different in 
degree from interstate interactions in which a pair of states agrees to form an economic 
union; and 
•  Rate of Change.  An interstate relationship may become more or less intense across a given 
period of time.  Moreover, a relationship does not cease at the point in time when the final  
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interaction “event” occurs.  Rather, it diminishes gradually with the continued absence of 
further interaction.  This reversion, or decay, towards neutrality is equally applicable to a 
cooperative or conflictual relationship.  This “memory” aspect of interstate relationships is 
evident in the difficulty states experience in attempting to stimulate a cooperative 
relationship with a state with which they have had a history of militarized conflict, as 
illustrated by the interactions between Israel and Syria in Shepherdstown discussed above.  
Whether cooperative or conflictual, the impact of events on the relationship between two 
states is likely to be a negative function of time. 
Having defined the components of dynamic nature of an interstate relationship, we now turn to 
formalizing a model that incorporates these four dimensions into a single concept.
5   
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTERSTATE INTERACTION 
At the core of our concept of interstate interaction is the assertion that the occurrence of an event 
between two states represents growth in the relationship based on this new information, and the absence 
of events is characterized by decay, or change that results from the lack of new information.  These 
processes of growth and decay are functions of the four dimensions of an interstate relationship outlined 
in the previous section (i.e., accumulation, temporal distance, degree, and rate of change).  In the 
following subsections, we develop our model of interstate relationship change based on these basic 
processes of growth and decay and the four dimensions addressed above.  Having done so, we combine 
these two processes into a single, dynamic representation of an interstate relationship, something we refer 
to as the Interstate Interaction Model. 
Growth: The Emergence of an Interstate Relationship 
The driving force behind the emergence of an interstate relationship is the repeated occurrence of 
events, regardless of whether these events are conflictual or cooperative.  Thus, we include in our model  
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a change in interstate interaction whenever an event between two states is observed.  This change, or 
shock, is shaped by two of the four dimensions of interstate interaction that we outline above.  The 
degree of interaction plays an integral role in determining the impact of the shock.  As the degree of 
interaction increases, so does its impact on the overall relationship.  Second, the impact of these 
interactions on the interstate relationship is tempered by the elapsed time, or temporal distance, since the 
previous event occurred.  Together these two dimensions are represented in the following functional form 
for a pair of states, or dyad, 
ii tt =+ − 11 β
Degree
Temporal Distance
t
t
,   [1] 
where it is the Interaction Level for a particular dyad for any given time period, t, it-1 is the dyad's 
Interaction Level in the previous period, and β 1 represents a weight that the researcher can introduce into 
the function.
6  Temporal Distancet is the duration since the previous interaction, and Degreet accounts 
for the extent of the interaction achieved by two states during an interaction.  The functional form 
represented in equation [1] introduces shocks to it whenever interactions occur.  The shock is intensified 
by the degree of the interaction, but dampened by an increase in the temporal distance from the previous 
interaction event.   
It is evident from the research on reciprocity that the two basic building blocks of interstate 
interaction are the general categories of conflict and cooperation.  Thus, the functional form expressed in 
equation [1] may be used to model conflictual and cooperative interactions between states.  Optimally, 
we might model these two behaviors within a single function by giving conflictual and cooperative 
shocks different directional qualities as follows:   
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ii tt =− F
HG I
KJ + F
HG I
KJ − 11 2 ββ
Degree of Conflict
Conflict Temporal Distance
Degree of Cooperation
Cooperation Temporal Distance
t
t
t
t
,  [2] 
where Degree of Conflictt and Degree of Cooperationt reflect the degree of cooperation and conflict in 
the event, respectively, and Conflict Temporal Distancet and Cooperation Temporal Distancet represent 
the elapsed time since the last conflictual and cooperative events, respectively.  Thus, this functional 
form introduces negative shocks to it whenever conflict between the two states occurs, and positive 
shocks to it whenever cooperation between the two states transpires.
7  Together, these shocks comprise 
the mechanism by which growth plays a role in changing interstate relationships.  Regardless of the type, 
the shock provides new information to the relationship based on new events that occur between the two 
states.  With growth so defined, we now move on to the issue of how interstate relationships change in 
the absence of such new information. 
Decay: The Diminishing Effect of Time 
The second fundamental process we wish to capture in our conceptualization of interstate 
interaction is the manner in which hostilities (or friendships) diminish over time.  Here we incorporate 
the notion of the rate of change, as well as temporal distance, and the accumulation of events, into the 
process of decay in an interstate relationship.  As argued above, in the absence of interaction between 
two states, the relationship should dissipate.  With respect to conflict, this argument follows the "time 
heals all wounds" logic.  In the absence of continued cooperation, past cooperative events should have a 
decreasing effect on the relationship, akin to the "what have you done for me lately" logic.  As such, in 
the absence of activity in a dyad, an interstate relationship tends toward a state of neutrality.  It is 
important to note that our underlying assumption here is that in order for an interstate relationship to 
become more contentious or more cooperative, new events must occur.  That is, in the absence of new 
activity, the relationship cannot continue to escalate or even maintain a constant level of hostility or 
friendship.
8  As a first step in approximating these arguments, we have chosen to apply a simple decay  
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function to the Interaction Level from the previous time period (it-1).
9  Such a function constantly drives 
the value of Interaction Level toward zero (neutrality) over time.  Given the basic structure of a decay 
function, the next step is to explore how the rate of this decay may vary across space and time. 
We formulate the rate of this decay function using two components.  First, we assume that as the 
interval of inactivity for a dyad increases, so does a relationship’s rate of dissipation.  Stated differently, 
as two states enjoy a longer period of peace, they forget their conflictual past at a faster rate.  Similarly, 
the longer two states endure without cooperating, the more rapidly they forget their cooperative past.  
Secondly, the interaction history in a given relationship is central to the ability of states to “forget the 
past.”  That is, as the total accumulation of interactions within a dyad increases, the rate of decay for the 
dyadic relationship (in the absence of interaction) decreases.  The logic behind this piece of the model is 
that as two states develop a history of frequent conflict or cooperation, their propensity to forget past 
behavior diminishes.  Together, these processes are modeled in the following fashion: 
ie i t t =
−
−
F
H
GG
I
K
JJ F
H
GGGG
I
K
JJJJ
<
α
α
Event Temporal Distance
Event History +1
t
t
1
0
,
,
   [3] 
where the decay function operates on it-1, Event Historyt is the accumulation of occurrences of conflict 
and cooperation between the dyad up to time t (the denominator is adjusted by adding a constant, so that 
it never assumes a value of zero), Event Temporal Distancet represents the time that has passed since the 
last event (either cooperative or conflictual), and the parameter α  weights the relative impact for the two 
factors.  Here, we hold α  to be positive, in order to ensure a decay toward neutrality.  The exponential 
decay is accelerated by increases in Event Temporal Distancet, but is decelerated by increases in Event 
Historyt.
10   
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Combining this decay process with the growth process developed above (see equation [2]) results 
in the following equation: 
11 2
Event Temporal Distancet
Event History +1 Degree of Conflict Degree of Cooperation t tt
Conflict Temporal Dist. Cooperation Temporal Dist. tt
,
0
tt ie i
α
ββ
α


 

−
− 
   
=− +    
    

≤
 [4] 
Thus, when assessing i1986, for example, one would first apply this decay function to i1985 and then 
determine whether or not any new conflict or cooperation occurs in 1986 that would result in negative or 
positive shocks for that interstate relationship.
11 
As it stands in equation [4], the model generates interaction levels ranging from –• to +•.  Our 
final task requires translating these values into a more intuitive range.  As such, we use the following 
transformation to bind the value of Interaction Level to a specific range: 
If i I
i
i
If i I
i
i
tt
t
t
tt
t
t
    then 
    then 
≥=
+
<=
−
−
>
0
0
0
,,
,,
γ
γ
γ
   [5] 
This transformation accomplishes two objectives.  First, it restricts the value of It to a range of –1 to +1, 
thereby providing an intuitive structure to the model.  Values of It that are close to a value of -1 reflect 
the strongest enemies, values of It that are close to a value of 0 reflect neutrality, and values of It close to 
+1 reflect the strongest friendships.  Second, the s-shaped functional form used in equation [5] creates a 
tapering effect such that as It increases towards +1 (or -1), larger shocks are required to continue such 
growth.  Thus, the same shock will have a larger impact when It is close to 0 than when it is close to +1.   
The logic behind this functional form is that at higher levels of interaction we expect to see further 
interaction, and we wish to force the model into requiring more extensive events in order to increase the 
degree of interaction further; interaction, regardless of type, has a diminishing effect on the extent of an  
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interstate relationship.  The parameter, γ , determines the rate of ascent (or descent) from zero to the +1 
(or -1) bound.  Larger values for γ  decrease the rate of change for It.
12  This flexibility allows the 
researcher to customize the bounding function.
13 
As a whole, the model incorporates all four dimensions of change in interstate relationships under 
the structure of growth and decay.  This conceptualization of interstate relationships goes beyond much 
of the previous work to integrate cooperation and conflict, and intuitively addresses the issue of event 
intensity.  By defining this interaction dynamic formally, we provide a model that is straightforward, 
flexible, continuous, and data-independent.  Using this model, researchers can study either conflict or 
cooperation, or both.  As such, it is an important alternative to treating the dynamic properties of 
interstate relationships as autoregressive error.  Rather than parsing the dynamic properties of interstate 
relations from the data, this model allows us to incorporate these dynamics explicitly into formal and 
empirical analyses of the study of international relations.  More importantly, our model of interstate 
interaction is born of theoretical propositions concerning the basis of interstate relationships, not 
empirically derived.  Thus, it is not contingent on any one data source, but is intended to accommodate a 
range of data sources on interstate interaction appropriate for a particular research question and from a 
data source of the researcher’s own choosing. 
Up to this point, we have focused on deriving a dynamic model of general interstate interaction.  
We turn now to an illustration of how this model may serve as a platform for generating measures of 
interstate interaction that are useful for empirical analysis.  Given this task, the next step necessitates that 
we operationalize a measurement representing the interaction level concept.  While we develop both the 
positive and negative shock dimensions in the Interstate Interaction Model formulated above (see 
equation [4]), our derivation of a specific measurement, as well as the empirical analysis, will focus 
solely on the negative (conflictual) shocks in dyadic behavior.
14   
The impetus behind our decision to restrict our focus solely to conflictual behavior is a function of 
the current literature as well as the availability of data.  As it stands, the conflict processes literature  
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relies heavily on the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set including the temporal period 1816-
1992 (see Jones, et al., 1996), and for illustrative purposes we wish to maintain some consistency with 
previous research.
15  Furthermore, we would like to demonstrate the feasibility of constructing a measure 
of interstate interaction based on the information currently available to the scholarly community.  The 
construction of measures reflective of a full-fledged operationalization of Interaction Level—i.e., 
employing the cooperative and conflictual elements identified in equation [4]—awaits explication in 
subsequent research. 
AN APPLICATION: DYADIC INTERACTION AND MILITARIZED DISPUTES 
The model that we outline in the previous section is designed to accommodate a range of data on 
interstate cooperation and conflict.  Given the reasoning that we cited above, however, in the remainder 
of the paper we focus our efforts on the conflict dimension of the model.  In doing so, we address our 
second task involving the testing of a primary hypothesis in the reciprocity, recurrent conflict, and rivalry 
literatures: that past interstate conflict positively affects the likelihood of current interstate conflict.  
However, our intent in the following exercise is not simply to show that history matters, but rather to 
demonstrate that history makes substantively important contributions to our models designed to predict 
the occurrence of interstate conflict.  That is, we wish to model these effects up front, rather than control 
or expunge them from our data series.  Indeed, as we have identified above, some research agendas in 
world politics focus on this very aspect of interstate behavior—how history shapes subsequent 
relationships.  
Research Design 
Our dual empirical interests of testing the aforementioned hypothesis and measuring the general 
contribution of our addition to a fully specified empirical model of interstate conflict necessitates that we 
conduct our analysis on a data sample that affords us an empirical benchmark.
16  Below, we rely on the  
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Oneal and Russett (1997) data as our benchmark.  These data draw on the Correlates of War (COW) 
interstate system membership list compiled by Singer and Small (1994) and employ the non-directional 
relevant dyad-year as the unit of analysis.
17  The data sample includes information on the militarized 
interstate conflict behavior and a set of covariates for 827 dyads for the period 1950-1985.  Although we 
refer the reader to Oneal and Russett’s article (1997:273-277, especially Table 1) for the details 
regarding variable operationalization, the set of covariates they employ include the following dyadic 
indicators familiar to the literature in conflict processes: democracy, alliance, contiguity, capability 
ratio, economic growth, and economic interdependence.  The data matrix compiled by Oneal and Russett 
(1997) contains a grand total of 19,722 complete records available for empirical analysis.  Before 
proceeding with our empirical analysis we discuss below some issues pertaining to the operationalization 
of the dependent variable and our measure of interstate interaction. 
Variables 
Dispute Involvement 
Oneal and Russett (1997:273) rely on the COW Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data (v2.10) 
to operationalize their dependent variable, Dispute Involvement.
18  This variable is scored a value of 1 
when a dyad is involved in one or more disputes (origination and ongoing) in given non-directional dyad-
year and 0 otherwise. 
Conflict Interaction Level 
In addition to the set of covariates furnished in the Oneal and Russett data set, our primary focus 
concerns the contribution of a measure of interstate interaction to a fully specified model of interstate 
behavior.  The task before us, then, is to translate the conflict component of the Interstate Interaction 
Model (see equation [4]) into an operational indicator that in turn may be specified in a statistical model.  
Given the information available to us in the MID data set, we proceed by translating equation [4] in the 
following manner:  
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where it is the Conflict Interaction Level between two states for a given year, t, it-1 is the previous year’s 
conflict interaction level,  HostLevt is the occurrence and severity of a militarized dispute for the given 
year t,
19 and PeaceYearst is the amount of time that has elapsed since the dyad last became involved in a 
dispute.  For years in which more than one dispute occurs between a dyad (n>1), HostLevt is aggregated 
across all disputes in that year.
20  With respect to the terminology in the model developed above (see 
equation [4]), PeaceYearst corresponds to Event Temporal Distancet and Conflict Temporal Distancet 
(which in this case are the same), PrevDisputest is a measure of Event Historyt, and HostLevt is the 
operationalization of Degree of Conflictt.
21  Equation [6] is then transformed using equation [5] to obtain 
a normalized Conflict Interaction Level, It, for each dyad-year in the Oneal and Russett sample.  We lag 
Conflict Interaction Level one dyad-year in order to avoid problems of causal circularity, a 
transformation resulting in a variable we refer to as Conflict Interaction Levelt-1.  Descriptive statistics 
for the entire set of covariates are reported in Table 1.
22 
____________________________________ 
Table 1 about here 
____________________________________ 
In Figure 1, we illustrate the behavior of conflict interaction levels for a sample of three dyads 
from the post-WWII period: India–Pakistan, Guyana–Brazil, and Argentina–United Kingdom. By 
illustrating the time-series properties of Conflict Interaction Level for each of three dyads, our intent is to 
demonstrate the sensitivity of this measure to qualitative differences between dyads exhibiting very 
distinct conflict histories.  The Conflict Interaction Level for the Guyana–Brazil dyad is representative of  
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a pair of states with a militarized interaction history that is characterized by infrequent and isolated 
militarized conflict.  Indeed, the Guyana–Brazil dyad reflects no evidence of long-term animosity 
between these two states.  Conversely, the Conflict Interaction Level for the Argentina–United Kingdom 
dyad reflects a relationship that is characterized by recurrent and severe conflict anchored in the 
Falklands War (1982).  In addition, the Argentina-United Kingdom dyad is also illustrative of an 
interstate relationship that is punctuated by extended periods of peace between conflictual events, as 
evidenced by the near neutrality of the Conflict Interaction Level during the period 1959-1975.  Finally, 
the Conflict Interaction Level for the India–Pakistan dyad illustrated in Figure 1 reflects an interstate 
relationship that exhibits chronic animosity during the period 1950-92.  As such, the India-Pakistan dyad 
characterizes an interstate relationship that the rivalry literature identifies as an enduring rivalry (see 
Goertz and Diehl, 1995, 1998, 2000).  
____________________________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
____________________________________ 
Method 
The dichotomous nature of our dependent variable, Dispute Involvement, leads us to conclude that 
using an ordinary least squares (OLS) method to estimate the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables is inappropriate (King, 1989, Liao, 1994).  As an alternative, we resort to logistic 
regression, a technique designed to estimate relationships between variables when the dependent variable 
is discrete.  Furthermore, it is also the statistical model that Oneal and Russett (1997) employ in their 
analysis of dispute involvement, and thus we wish to retain consistency with their method of analysis. 
In estimating these logit models, our initial concern is with the direction and statistical significance 
of the variable Conflict Interaction Level as it pertains to the dependent variable, Dispute Involvement.  
Specifically, since the hypothesis we wish to test asserts that past conflict interaction will increase the  
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likelihood of subsequent dispute involvement, we seek to confirm or disconfirm this relationship.  In 
addition, we are also interested in the extent to which our inclusion of the variable Conflict Interaction 
Level improves the overall statistical performance of our logit models.  That is, we would like to 
determine whether we are statistically significantly better at predicting the dependent variable, Dispute 
Involvement, by including the variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 in our logit specification.
23  In 
conducting this "competition" between a logit model including the measure of conflict interaction (i.e., 
the “saturated” model) and a logit model excluding this measure (i.e., the “restricted” model), we rely on 
the likelihood ratio test (King, 1989) to assess the relative goodness of fit of these models. 
Analysis 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in five stages.  First, we replicate a representative model from 
Oneal and Russett’s study.  Second, we re-estimate the Oneal and Russett specification, but include the 
variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1, in order to allow us to determine whether there is empirical support 
for the hypothesis that a dyad’s past militarized dispute behavior affects the probability of current dispute 
origination.  In addition, we resort to the likelihood ratio test statistic to determine whether the inclusion 
of our measure of conflict interaction, Conflict Interaction Levelt-1, significantly improves the ability of 
the fully specified model formulated by Oneal and Russett (1997) to predict dyadic militarized interstate 
conflict.
24   
Third, for the sake of comparison we remove the variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 from the 
model and re-estimate the model including the “logit-spline” specification formulated by Beck, et al. 
(1998).  Fourth, we estimate a fully saturated model containing all of the covariates specified by Oneal 
and Russett, the Beck, et al. logit-spline covariates, and Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 in order to assess the 
statistical and substantive importance of our theoretically-based measure, Conflict Interaction Levelt-1, 
relative to the statistical correction proposed by Beck, et al.  Finally, we demonstrate the relative 
importance of the variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 for the prediction of militarized disputes.    
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We report the results of our logit analyses in Table 2.  Model (1) is a replication of the best 
performing logit model reported by Oneal and Russett.
25  Next, in model (2) we estimate a logit model in 
which we introduce the variable that is of primary interest, Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 to the original 
model specified by Oneal and Russett.  Inspection of the coefficient estimating the impact of Conflict 
Interaction Levelt-1 on Dispute Involvement reveals a highly statistically significant and negative 
relationship (p<.001).  Indeed, the coefficient for Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 suggests that as the past 
conflict interaction level within a dyad intensifies (becomes more negative, given our scaling of conflict 
from 0 to –1) the log odds of a dispute origination occurring in the current period increase.  A survey of 
the remaining variables indicates that coefficients for some of the covariates become insignificant when 
we include Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 in the logit specification.  Specifically, the coefficients for the 
variables DemocracyH and DemocracyL*Contiguity attenuate to insignificance in our revised model.  
Furthermore, in every case the magnitudes of the coefficients attenuate with the introduction of Conflict 
Interaction Levelt-1.  In sum, model (2) suggests empirical support for the general hypothesis advanced in 
several literatures: dyadic militarized conflict begets dyadic militarized conflict, while dyadic peace 
begets dyadic peace.   
____________________________________ 
Table 2 about here 
____________________________________ 
Our second task involves determining whether the introduction of the variable Conflict Interaction 
Levelt-1 into the logit model significantly improves the overall ability of the set of covariates to predict 
the dependent variable.  We can determine whether this is the case by calculating a likelihood-ratio test 
statistic between the results reported for models (1) and (2).  Estimating a likelihood ratio test requires 
that the models of interest be "nested" (Long 1997).  In terms of the models reported in Table 2, model 
(1) is nested in model (2).  Calculating a likelihood ratio test between models (1) and (2) reveals that the  
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addition of the variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 significantly improves our ability to predict the 
dependent variable, Dispute Involvement (p<0.0001).
26   
For the purposes of comparison, were are interested in comparing the performance of the variable 
Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 specified in model (2) to Beck, et al.’s logit spline.  Model (3) re-estimates 
the Oneal and Russett model (model 1) while incorporating Beck, Katz and Tucker’s correction.  
Consistent with their analysis (Beck, et al., 1998, 1277), the logit-spline correction attenuates the 
statistical significance for several of the causal variables that were estimated to be statistically significant 
in model (1).  While we cannot directly compare models (2) and (3) because neither model is nested 
within the other, we can indirectly compare the two approaches by estimating a fourth model including 
both the variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 and the logit-spline covariates.  Due to the fact that models 
(2) and (3) are nested within model (4), we can perform a pair of likelihood ratio tests to determine 
whether either approach (i.e., Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 versus logit-spline) renders the other approach 
unnecessary from an econometric standpoint.   
Perhaps it is telling to point out that both the variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 and the variable 
PeaceYrs from the logit-spline correction are negative and statistically significant in model (4); that is, 
neither variable overpowers the other in the model and we can conclude that these two variables do not 
represent identical information.  Our first likelihood ratio test compares model (3) (the logit-spline model 
without the Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 variable) and model (4) (the saturated model) to test whether the 
Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 variable improves our ability to predict ongoing disputes.  The test results 
(χ
2(1) = 142.17, p(χ
2) < 0.001) indicate that, even when using the logit-spline technique, the Conflict 
Interaction Levelt-1 variable significantly improves the performance of the saturated model.   
The second likelihood ratio test compares model (2) and model (4) to determine if the logit-spline 
correction improves upon a model that includes the Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 variable.  Similar to the 
previous likelihood-ratio test, the results (χ
2(4) = 759.17, p(χ
2) < 0.001) indicate that the inclusion of the 
logit-spline correction improves upon our ability to predict ongoing disputes.  In short, we find here that  
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both the theoretical variable advanced in this paper and the econometric correction advanced by Beck, et 
al. prove to be important additions to the model of dispute origination proposed by Oneal and Russett.   
These findings also underscore our position that the variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 and the 
logit-spline parameters are not in direct competition with one another.  Rather, these two pieces of 
information are different, but not necessarily incompatible, approaches to assessing the impact of 
temporal history on interstate relations.  We maintain that our approach offers interpretive advantages 
over the Beck, et al. approach that are independent of this competition.  This is less a critique of the 
Beck, et al. econometric technique than it is an understanding that the two approaches serve different 
purposes.  The econometric technique is designed to enable the researcher to obtain the correct parameter 
estimates for the variables of interest, while our approach is designed to include the historical 
relationship among this list of variables that are of substantive interest.  As such, we do not envision 
these approaches as mutually exclusive. 
Next, we turn to estimating the relative impact of several of the covariates reported in model (2) on 
the log odds of dispute origination.  By doing so, we are able to estimate the relative impact of each 
independent variable on the origination of militarized interstate conflict and we can determine the 
substantive importance of including the variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 in our predictive model of 
interstate behavior.  In Table 3, we report each covariate’s impact on the probability of Dispute 
Involvement as measured in percentage change.  Specifically, we calculate the percentage change in the 
probability of an involvement in a militarized interstate dispute based on two values for each covariate, 
the maximum and minimum values as reported above in Table 1.  In terms of the maximum values of the 
covariates, it is clear that when set to their maximum values, the covariates Democracy ScoreL, 
Capability Ratio, GrowthL*Contiguity and Conflict Interaction Levelt-1, each exert a negative influence 
on the probability of a dyad becoming involved in a militarized dispute.  Recall, that at its maximum the 
value of Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 is 0, or neutrality (given the complete –1 to +1 range if we were to 
include cooperative events.)  Therefore, when a dyad achieves neutrality, the probability of a dispute  
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involvement decreases by about 7%.  Alternatively, the percentage change corresponding to the variable 
Capability Ratio suggests that when there is considerable disparity in the capabilities held by each state 
in a dyad (i.e. one state is vastly more powerful than its dyad partner), the probability of the dyad 
engaging in a dispute is reduced by 100%.   
Turning to the calculations reported in the right-hand half of Table 3 wherein we examine the 
impact of the covariates when set to their respective minimums, some very intriguing information 
emerges.  In particular, our calculations indicate that while non-contiguous dyads are 48% less likely to 
engage in a dispute, each of the remaining covariates has a positive impact on the probability of a dispute 
involvement.  Perhaps most striking are estimated effects of the variables Growth*Contiguity and 
Conflict Interaction Levelt-1.  Indeed, contiguous dyads in which negative dyadic growth rates obtain 
experience an increase in the probability of a dispute involvement of up to 1,699%.  Similarly, the 
measure that we have derived from our dynamic model of interstate interaction, the variable Conflict 
Interaction Levelt-1, increases the probability of a dyad engaging in a dispute involvement by up to 
1,781%.  These findings underscore the importance of including this information in the standard 
specification of dyadic militarized conflict.  Finally, as an alternative method of illustrating the impact of 
conflict interaction on dispute involvement, in Figure 2 we plot this probability across the range of values 
for the variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1.  In short, as the conflictual interaction between two states 
increases (becomes more negative), the probability of a dyadic militarized dispute involvement increases 
markedly.  
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____________________________________ 
Table 3 and Figure 2 about here 
____________________________________ 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our empirical analysis of the conflict interaction variable derived from our dynamic model of 
interstate interaction leads to several conclusions.  First, we find empirical support for the hypothesis 
advanced at the outset of the paper that past interstate interaction is an important predictor of current 
behavior.  Second, from a purely statistical standpoint, the empirical analysis demonstrates that inclusion 
of the variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 significantly increases our overall ability to predict the 
probability of interstate conflict.  Moreover, the information contained in this variable is not reflected 
entirely in the purely econometric approach advanced in Beck, et al., (1998).
27   
Third, the variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 makes an important substantive contribution to our 
ability to predict the occurrence of interstate conflict, and is relatively more significant in its independent 
impact on the probability of militarized interstate dispute involvement relative to the independent effects 
exhibited by several standard control variables, such as dyadic democracy and relative capability.  
Fourth, our analysis convinces us that, based on this general model of interstate interaction, we can 
develop measures of interstate behavior capturing the dynamic, memory-oriented aspect of dyadic 
interaction with information about interstate behavior currently available to the field.  Finally, in 
demonstrating the viability of our model for empirical analysis, we resort to data contained in the MID 
data set.  However, these data represent only one type and source of interstate interaction.  We remain 
convinced that in future research it may prove even more advantageous to incorporate data on 
cooperative and conflictual behaviors simultaneously in a full-fledged measure of interstate interaction, 
as well as drawing on more than one source of data to inform empirical operationalizations of these 
models.    
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It is evident to us that the quantitative literature on conflict processes is becoming increasingly 
oriented toward the analysis of interstate interaction as a series of discrete events.  However, the notion 
that interstate interactions may be represented as discrete phenomena is inconsistent with the evidence of 
the dynamic qualities of interstate relationships identified in the early work on arms races and interstate 
action-reaction, more recent research on interstate reciprocity, recurrent conflict, and rivalry, and our 
intuition as scholars of world politics.  A dynamic approach to studying interstate interaction provides a 
firmer basis for prediction, allowing us to incorporate these dynamic properties more explicitly as both 
explanans and explandums in the statistical models that we specify.  Doing so affords the researcher the 
ability to avoid the nettlesome issue of using interstate behavior, such as militarized conflict, as a case 
selection device in order to identify a subset of dyads which in turn are then studied for their conflict 
behavior.  Instead, interstate behavior such as rivalry can be conceptualized and operationalized as a 
continuous property across the universe of dyads.  This approach provides the researcher with 
explanatory leverage that is not afforded by the use of econometric techniques to control for temporal 
dependence.   
In the end, we anticipate that some scholars will find our conceptualization of interstate interaction 
too simple.  We submit that absent from our model are several dimensions that may be relevant to the 
characterization of interstate relationships, such as the incorporation of political leaders' perceptions of 
friends and enemies as suggested by Thompson (1995, 1998), or the identification of the issues forming 
the foundation of an interstate relationship, as urged by Bennett (1996).  Yet, we must begin somewhere, 
and we believe that the model of interstate interaction that we propose herein accomplishes precisely 
what models political behavior are designed to do: provide a general theoretical platform from which 
individual scholars may make modifications as necessitated by their research questions.  
More importantly, building models to match what our theories and our intuition suggest is an 
international environment replete with dynamic interactions between states will compel us to incorporate 
these properties directly into our statistical analyses.  Ultimately, adding this dynamism back into our  
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empirical investigations will serve to fortify our ability to make predictions about political behavior.  We 
consider our efforts as merely the first salvo of what we hope will be a fruitful “second generation” of 
dynamic models of interstate interaction.  As such, we hope that this exercise stimulates researchers to 
unify competing research agendas toward the goal of obtaining a firmer grasp of causality in interstate 
relations.  
 
28 
 
REFERENCES 
Axelrod, R., and R. O. Keohane.  (1985)  Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy:  Strategies and 
Institutions.  World Politics 38:226-254. 
Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Azar, E. (1993) Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948-82. Third Release. Computer File.  Ann 
Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. ICPSR 7767. 
Beck, N., and R. Tucker. (1996) “Conflict in Space and Time: Time-Series—Cross-Section Analysis 
with Binary Dependent Variables.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, San Francisco. 
Beck, N., J. N. Katz, and R. Tucker. (1998) Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series—Cross-Section 
Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable.  American Journal of Political Science 42:1260-1288. 
Bennett, D. S., and A. Stam III. (1998) "Expected Utility Theory and Comparative Theory Testing." 
Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, 
Minneapolis, MN. 
Bennett, D. S. (1996) Security, Bargaining, and the End of Interstate Rivalry, 1816-1992. International 
Studies Quarterly 40:157-84. 
Bennett, D. S. (1997a) Democracy, Regime Change, and Rivalry Termination. International Interactions 
22:369-397. 
Bennett, D. S. (1997b) Measuring Rivalry Termination, 1816-1992. Journal of Conflict Resolution 
41:227-54. 
Bennett, D. S. (1998) Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration. American Journal of Political 
Science 42:1200-1232.  
 
29 
Bolks, S. M. (1998) "Defining Threat: A Theoretical and Operational Examination of Threat in 
International Relations." Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International 
Studies Association, Minneapolis. 
Brecher, M., and J. Wilkenfeld. (1997) A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Bremer, S. A. (1992) Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-
1965. Journal of Conflict Resolution 36:309-341. 
Bremer, S. A. (1993) Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965. International 
Interactions 18:231-49. 
Bremer, S. A. (1996.) “Power Parity, Political Similarity, and Capability Concentration: Comparing 
Three Explanations of Major Power Conflict,” Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual 
Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego. 
Bremer, S. A., and T. R. Cusack, eds. (1995) The Process of War. New York: Gordon and Breach. 
Cioffi-Revilla, C. (1998) “The Political Uncertainty of Interstate Rivalries: A Punctuated Equilibrium 
Model,” In The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries, edited by P. F. Diehl, pp. 64-97. Champaign, IL: 
University of Illinois. 
Clark, D. H., and R. A. Hart, Jr. (1998) Controlling for Duration Dependence in Conflict Analyses: A 
Replication and Extension of ‘Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations.’ American Journal of 
Political Science 42:1335-1342. 
Diehl, P. F. (1985) Arms Races to War: Testing Some Empirical Linkages. Sociological Quarterly 
26:331-49. 
Diehl, P. F. (1992) What Are They Fighting For? The Importance of Issues in International Conflict 
Research. Journal of Peace Research 29:333-344. 
Diehl, P. F. (1998) “Introduction: An Overview and Some Theoretical Guidelines.” In The Dynamics of 
Enduring Rivalries, edited by P. F. Diehl, pp. 1-25. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.  
 
30 
Diehl, P. F., and G. Goertz. (2000). War and Peace in International Rivalry.  Ann Arbor, MI: University 
of Michigan Press. 
Dixon, W. J. (1983) Measuring Interstate Affect. American Journal of Political Science 27:828-851. 
Gartzke, E., and M. W. Simon. (1999) Hot Hand: A Critical Analysis of Enduring Rivalries. Journal of 
Politics 61:777-798. 
Gelpi, C. (1997) Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining. American Political 
Science Review 91:339-60. 
Goertz, G. (1998) Personal electronic communication with the authors, April 13. 
Goertz, G., and P. F. Diehl. (1992) The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries. International 
Interactions 18:151-163. 
Goertz, G., and P. F. Diehl. (1993) Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns. 
International Studies Quarterly 37:147-171. 
Goertz, G., and P. F. Diehl. (1995) The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of 
Political Shocks. American Journal of Political Science 39:30-52. 
Goertz, G., and P. F. Diehl. (1996) Taking Enduring out of Enduring Rivalry: The Rivalry Approach to 
War and Peace. International Interactions 21:291-308. 
Goertz, G., and P. F. Diehl. (1997) “Linking Risky Dyads: An Evaluation of Relations Between Enduring 
Rivalries.” In Enforcing Cooperation: “Risky” States and Intergovernmental Management of 
Conflict, edited by G. Schneider and P. Weitsman, pp.132-160. New York: Macmillan. 
Goertz, G., and P. F. Diehl. (1998) “The Rivalry Data Set.” University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. 
http://wsi.cso.uiuc.edu/polisci/faculty/diehl/ER.HTML. 
Goertz, G., and P. F. Diehl. (2000) “(Enduring) Rivalries.” In Handbook of War Studies II, edited by M. 
I. Midlarsky, pp. 222-267. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.  
Goldstein, J. S. (1991) Reciprocity in Superpower Relations: An Empirical Analysis. International 
Studies Quarterly 35:195-209.  
 
31 
Goldstein, J. S. (1992) A Conflict-Cooperation Scale for WEIS International Events Data. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 36:369-85. 
Goldstein, J. S. (1995) Great-Power Cooperation Under Conditions of Limited Reciprocity: From 
Empirical to Formal Analysis. International Studies Quarterly 39:453-477. 
Goldstein, J. S., and J. R. Freeman. (1990) Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Goldstein, J. S., and J. C. Pevehouse. (1997). Reciprocity, Bullying, and International Cooperation: 
Time-series Analysis of the Bosnia Conflict. American Political Science Review 91:515-30. 
Hegre, H., T. Ellingsen, N. P. Gleditsch, and S. Gates. (1997) "Towards a Democratic Civil Peace? 
Democracy, Democratization, and Civil War 1816-1992." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the Peace Science Society (International), Indianapolis. 
Henderson, E. A. (1998) The Democratic Peace Through the Lens of Culture, 1820-1989. International 
Studies Quarterly 42:461-484. 
Hensel, P. R. (1994) One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America, 
1816-1986. Journal of Peace Research 31:281-298. 
Hensel, P. R. (1996) The Evolution of Interstate Rivalry. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 
Urbana-Champaign. 
Huth, P. K., and B. M. Russett. 1993. General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three 
Competing Models. American Political Science Review 87:61-73. 
Jones, D. M., S. A. Bremer, and J. D. Singer. (1996) Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: 
Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns. Conflict Management and Peace Science 15:163-
213. 
King, G. (1989) Unifying Political Methodology: The Likelihood Theory of Statistical Inference.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
32 
Kinsella, D. (1994) Conflict in Context: Arms Transfers and Third World Rivalries During the Cold War. 
American Journal of Political Science 38:557-581. 
Kinsella, D. (1995) Nested Rivalries: Superpower Competition, Arms Transfers, and Regional Conflict, 
1950-1990. International Interactions 15:109-125. 
Leng, R., and H. Wheeler. (1979) Influence Strategies, Success, and War. Journal of Conflict Resolution 
23:655-684. 
Leng, R., and S. Walker. (1982) Crisis Bargaining: Confrontation, Coercion, and Reciprocity. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 26:571-591. 
Leng, R. (1983) When Will They Ever Learn: Coercive Bargaining in Coercive Crises. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 27:379-419. 
Leng, R. (1993) Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1980: Realism Versus Reciprocity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Liao, T. F. (1994) Interpreting Probability Models: Logit, Probit, and Other Generalized Linear Models.  
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Lieberman, E. (1995) What Makes Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring 
Rivalry. Security Studies 4:851-910. 
Long, J. S. (1997) Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables.  Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Maoz, Z., and B. M. Russett. (1993) Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-86. 
American Political Science Review 87:624-638. 
Maoz. Z. (1984) A Behavior Model of Dispute Escalation: The Major Powers, 1816-1976. International 
Interactions 10:373-399. 
McGinnis, M., and J. Williams. (1989) Change and Stability in Superpower Rivalry. American Political 
Science Review 83:1101-1123.  
 
33 
McGinnis, M. (1990) A Rational Model of Regional Rivalry. International Studies Quarterly 34:111-
135. 
Moore, W. H. (1995) Reciprocity and the Domestic-International Conflict Nexus During the ‘Rhodesia 
Problem.’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 39:129-167. 
North, R. C., R. Brody, and O. R. Holsti. (1964) Some Empirical Data on the Conflict Spiral. Peace 
Research Society Papers 1:1-14. 
Oneal, J. R. and . M. Russett. (1999) The Kantian Peace: Assessing the Pacific Benefits of Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992. World Politics 52:1-37. 
Oneal, J. R., and B. M. Russett. (1997) The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, 
and Conflict, 1950-1985. International Studies Quarterly 41:267-294. 
Oren, I. (1994) The Indo-Pakistani Arms Competition: A Deductive Statistical Analysis. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 38:185-214. 
Partell, P. J. (1997) Escalation at the Outset: An Analysis of Targets' Responses in Militarized Interstate 
Disputes. International Interactions 23:1-35. 
Pindyck, R. S., and D. L. Rubinfeld. (1991) Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts. 3
rd ed. New 
York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Rajmaira, S., and M. D. Ward. (1990) Evolving Foreign Policy Norms: Reciprocity in the Superpower 
Triad. International Studies Quarterly 34:457-475. 
Rajmaira, S. (1997) Indo-Pakistani Relations: Reciprocity in Long-term Perspective. International 
Studies Quarterly 41:547-560. 
Rajmaira, S. (1999) “Enter the Dragon: China's Role in the Indo-Pakistani Rivalry.” Unpublished 
Manuscript.  Department of Political Science, East Carolina University. 
Raknerud, A., and H. Hegre. (1997) The Hazard of War: Reassessing Evidence for the Democratic Peace. 
Journal of Peace Research 34:385-404.  
 
34 
Remmer, K. L. 1998. Does Democracy Promote Interstate Cooperation? Lessons from the Mercosur 
Region. International Studies Quarterly 42:25-52. 
Richardson, L. F. (1960) Arms and Insecurity. Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood Press. 
Rioux, J.-S. (1998) “New Leaders, New States and Reputation: An Empirical Examination of Twentieth 
Century Crises.” Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies 
Association, Minneapolis. 
Singer, J. D., and M. Small. (1994) Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-
1992. Computer File.  Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research. ICPSR #9905. 
StataCorp. (1999) Stata Statistical Software: Release 6.0. College Station, TX: Stata Corporation. 
Thompson, W. R. (1995) Principal Rivalries. Journal of Conflict Resolution 39:195-223. 
Thompson, W. R., ed. (1998) Great Power Rivalries. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. 
Tucker, R. M. (1996) The Interstate Dyad-Year Dataset, 2.1 ed. Computer file. Vanderbilt University. 
Wallace, M. (1979) Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 
23:3-16. 
Ward, M. W. (1981) Seasonality, Reaction, Expectation, Adaptation, and Memory in Cooperative and 
Conflictual Foreign Policy. International Interactions 8:229-246. 
Ward, M. W. (1982) Cooperation and Conflict in Foreign Policy Behavior. International Studies 
Quarterly 26:87-126. 
Wilkenfeld, J., and M. Brecher. (1997) ICB2–International Crisis Behavior Project Codebook. 
ICPSR Study #9286. 
Zinnes, D. A. (1968) “The Expression and Perception of Hostility in Prewar Crisis: 1914.” In 
Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, edited by J. D. Singer, pp. 85-119. New 
York, NY: Free Press.  
 
35 
Zinnes, D. A. (1976) Contemporary Research in International Relations: A Perspective and Critical 
Appraisal. New York, NY: The Free Press. 
Zinnes, D. A. and R. G. Muncaster. (1984) The Dynamics of Hostile Activity and the Prediction of War. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 28:187-229. 
 
36 
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Allies  01
Capability Ratio 161.681 435.299 1 7775.63
Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 -0.045 0.173 -0.99 0
Contiguity  01
Democracy ScoreH 4.740 7.135 -10 10
Democracy ScoreL -3.574 6.884 -10 10
DemocracyL*contiguity -1.183 4.293 -10 10
Dyadic trade-to-GDP ratioL 0.002 0.008 0 0.177
Economic Growth RateL 0.780 3.359 -26.49 15.32
GrowthL*contiguity 0.197 2.118 -26.49 15.32
Trend, dyadic trade-to-GDP ratioH 0.0001 0.015 -0.221 0.355
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Variable Model 1
a
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 β -4.069 -1.694
SEβ 0.117 0.141
Democracy ScoreL -0.078 -0.053 -0.060 -0.050
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
Democracy ScoreH 0.036 0.006 0.024 0.013
0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007
Economic Growth RateL 0.088 0.052 0.028 0.020
0.024 0.022 0.020 0.020
Allies -0.703 -0.414 -0.327 -0.285
0.083 0.099 0.099 0.104
Contiguity 1.830 0.977 0.899 0.654
0.127 0.140 0.135 0.142
Capability Ratio -0.0024 -0.001 -0.0019 -0.0014
0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003
Dyadic trade-to-GDP ratioL -84.139 -39.745 -22.359 -16.923
20.800 15.752 13.560 13.126
Trend, dyadic trade-to-GDP ratioH -9.414 -8.172 -3.499 -3.265
2.593 3.170 2.999 3.175
DemocracyL*contiguity 0.028 0.029 0.015 0.018
0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017
GrowthL*contiguity -0.165 -0.140 -0.091 -0.091
0.023 0.026 0.025 0.025
Constant -3.898 -4.081 -0.865 -1.452
0.118 0.120 0.137 0.152
PeaceYrs
b -1.115 -0.887
0.053 0.055
χ
2 562.46 1986.77 1864.28 2094.04
Log likelihood -3186.11 -2548.48 -2239.98 -2168.8939
Pseudo R
2 0.114 0.291 0.377 0.397
Note: N = 19,772.  Bold = p < .001;  Italics = p < .01.  All significance levels are two-tailed.
aModel 1 is a replication of Oneal and Russett (1997, 282, Table 4) Eqn. 7.
bThe spline coefficients are not reported.
TABLE 2. Models of Dispute Involvement, 1950-85
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 Here, we define Arab neighbors to mean any state with a Correlates of War (COW) state number 
>=600 and < 700.  The interval we consider is 1948-1992.  The COW state membership list (version 
1997.1) is available from the following URL: http://pss.la.psu.edu/intsys.html. 
2 We should note, however, that there have been efforts from within this “discrete conflict” tradition 
to study interstate conflict from a more dynamic, process-oriented approach.  In particular, see the 
contributions to the volume edited by Bremer and Cusack (1995). 
3 See, for example, the Cochrane-Orcutt and Hildreth-Lu procedures (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). 
4 Diehl and Goertz refer to this method as one that is grounded in “time-density” criteria.  We argue 
that there is an element of operational circularity in this criteria, a schema in which the authors propose a 
set of empirical criteria for differentiating between "isolated," "proto," and "enduring" dyadic rivalries.  
Specifically, the framework is formulated such that the classification of a rivalry at time t-1 is, in part, a 
function of a dyad's behavior at times t and t+n (Goertz, 1998).  According to Goertz and Diehl 
(1995:33), “an enduring rivalry is a competition between states that involves six or more militarized 
disputes between the same two states over a period of 20 years.”  They classify the interactions between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, as an enduring rivalry beginning in 1946 (see Table 
1, 1992:156).  The sixth dispute between these two states, however, does not occur until 1957 (#26, 
1948; #1286, 1949; #50, 1953; #208, 1953; #200, 1955; and #607, 1957).  Thus, this time-density 
framework “backcodes” from the year in which the six-dispute threshold is reached to include those 
years in which a future enduring rivalry is actually passing through the "isolated" and "proto" stages.  
Therefore, researchers employing this framework are likely to confront the problem of circularity if they 
use Goertz and Diehl's variable for measuring the presence or absence of enduring rivalry as an 
independent variable to predict militarized conflict.  See also Gartzke and Simon (1999) for a treatment 
of extant coding schemes for identifying interstate rivalries.  
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5 We owe a special debt of gratitude to Chad Atkinson, Dina Zinnes, and Robert Muncaster of the 
Merriam Lab for their contributions and encouragement during the development of this model. 
6 This parameter weights the impact of the shock on it.  It may be the case that researchers will have a 
theoretical motivation for adjusting β .   
7 Indeed, one could build multiple shocks for each phenomenon.  These shocks are then weighted by 
their β  parameters to equilibrate their maximum and minimum values.  For example, if the conflict shock 
ranges from 0 to 10 and the cooperative shock ranges from 0 to 5, the parameters would be set to a 1:2 
ratio.  While this does not completely assuage the problems related to the ordinal character of such 
information, it constrains the behavior of both shocks to the same range. 
8 This assumption places our approach in contrast to the punctuated equilibrium models discussed in 
Cioffi-Revilla (1998) and Diehl (1998). 
9 Similar approaches to modeling the decay properties of conflict history are employed by Hegre, et 
al. (1997) in their study of regime changes and civil war, by Partell (1997) in his study of dispute 
escalation, and by Raknerud and Hegre (1997) in their study of the hazard of interstate war. 
10 An anonymous reviewer suggested an inverse relationship between Event History and Event 
Temproal Distance, arguing that memory fades quickly at first and then slows down and that as events 
accumulate the decay function increases.  We constructed this alternative model and put it through the 
same operationalization and empirical analysis as the original model.  An informal comparison between 
our model and the reviewer’s alternative indicates that (given the data and methods used herein) the 
original model outperforms the alternative. 
11 This example assumes that the temporal unit of analysis is the calendar year.  However, the model 
is flexible in that it can incorporate any level of temporal aggregation (e.g., days, months, decades), as 
long as this level remains consistent across shocks and throughout the entire analysis.  
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12 For example, if γ  is set to 0.1, then an unbounded score (it) of 0.1 translates to a bounded score (It) 
of 0.5.  If γ  is set to 1, however, then the same unbounded score translates to a bounded score of 0.09.    
13 We should note that the decision to use the bounding function resides with the researcher, based 
upon how the researcher conceptualizes the accruement of interstate interaction. 
14 In this vein, see Rioux (1998) and Bolks (1998) for continuous measures of interstate threat. 
15 We are aware that alternative data sources (e.g., the WEIS [Goldstein, 1992], COPDAB [Azar, 
1984], or the International Crisis Behavior Project [ICB] [Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997; Wilkenfeld 
and Brecher, 1997] data sets) provide different information regarding interstate behavior.  However, our 
primary purpose in the empirical analysis that follows is simply one of explication; the model that we 
present is flexible enough to rely on any number of sources of interstate behavior as determined by the 
researcher. 
16 From our perspective, benchmark data have three important qualities.  First, a benchmark contains 
a set of covariates that the literature accepts as approximating a fully specified model on interstate 
conflict.  Second, these data are used in published research.  Finally, that these data are in the public 
domain.   
17 A nondirectional dyad analysis assesses the qualities of covariates as they obtain conjointly.  
Relevant dyads are those dyads in which the states comprising a dyad are either geographically 
contiguous or at least one member of the dyad qualifies as a major power according the to the COW 
definition (Singer and Small, 1994).  See the discussion of relevant dyads in Oneal and Russett (1997) 
and Maoz and Russett (1993). 
18 The dispute data are available from the following URL: http://pss.la.psu.edu. 
19 In years in which more than one dispute occurs, the total number of disputes per year is obtained. 
HostLevt is only a satisfactory measure of dispute severity on two counts.  From a theoretical standpoint  
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one may desire to weight military actions by costs, such that instances of "use of force" without battle 
deaths are less significant than are instances of "use of force" where battle deaths are incurred by one, or 
both, of the parties to a dispute.  From an empirical standpoint, the modal category of behavior in the 
MID data is "use of force" (HostLevt=4), which, it turns out, represents a rather inclusive category of 
actions by states, with the inclusion of fishery disputes involving third parties, reconnaissance over-
flights, and low-level uses of force, for example, in addition to the more familiar formal military 
engagements.  Initially, we intended to compensate for this problem by incorporating "fatality levels" in 
an additive or multiplicative transformation with HostLevt, but we were ultimately discouraged from 
doing so given the ordinal nature of the two variables.  Thus, we argue that the error component 
contained in HostLevt is a constraint imposed upon us by the dispute data, not by the continuous measure 
of conflict interaction that we construct herein. 
20 This is denoted by indicating i disputes, and summing all severity scores over all i disputes for a 
given dyad-year.  For example, assume that in one year a dyad engages in three disputes with HostLev 
scores of 3, 4, and 5, respectively.  We simply add these three scores together to get a total HostLev of 12 
for that dyad-year.  
21 Given no theoretical or operational motivation to do otherwise, we assign a value of 1 to the α , β , 
and γ  parameters. 
22 We calculated the conflict interaction levels for the universe of non-directional dyad-years 
contained in Tucker’s (1996) “Dyad Hard: The Interstate Dyad-Year Dataset,” (v2.1) for the period 
1816-1992.  Therefore, when analyzing the Oneal and Russett benchmark data, we rely on the value for 
the variable Conflict Interaction Levelt-1 in the year 1949 to inform the analysis in year 1950 and so forth 
for the remainder of the 1950 to 1992 period.  The conflict interaction levels for the universe of non-
directional dyad-years for the period 1816-1992, as well as the data and command files employed in our 
benchmark tests reported herein, are available from the authors upon request.  
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23 For examples of this comparative theory testing approach to the study of interstate conflict, see 
Bremer (1992, 1993, 1996) and Bennett and Stam (1998). 
24 Our empirical analyses were carried out in Stata 6.0 (StataCorp 1999). 
25 We determine “best performing” by simply comparing the log likelihood values for all of the 
models Oneal and Russett estimate on the sample containing 19,772 observations (the largest sample 
available for analysis.)  According to these criteria the best performing model is specified in Table 4, 
equation [7] of their article (1997:282).  We are grateful to Oneal and Russett for providing their data and 
command files. 
26 We use the likelihood-ratio test specified in King (1989:84-5), ℜ =2(lnL*-lnLR*), where ℜ  is the 
likelihood ratio test statistic, lnL* is the log-likelihood of the unrestricted model, and lnLR* is the log-
likelihood of the restricted model.  With respect to the comparison between models (1) and (2), ℜ  = 2((-
2548.48)-(-3186.11)) = 1275.27, and we are able to reject the hypothesis that the inclusion of Conflict 
Interaction Levelt-1 makes an insignificant contribution to the overall predictive capacity of the model 
(p<0.0001, df=1).  We also conduct a more stringent test by including a lagged dependent variable in 
both models (1 and 2), with similar results that lead to the same conclusion enabling us to reject the null 
hypothesis. 
27 Furthermore, we find that the measure we derive from the dynamic model of interstate interaction 
is important despite the fact that we have not included information about cooperative actions that might 
have occurred between these dyads.  Incorporating these cooperative actions would likely reduce the 
error component in the variable and therefore do a better job of predicting the dependent variable, dispute 
involvement. 